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I. INTRODUCTION
The intersection of two separate areas of law is considered in this paper,
in light of two critical recent developments, one in Congress and the other in
the recent decisions involving investigations by the Office of Independent
Counsel. Congress has just passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1998 which requires each United States District Court to authorize by
local rule the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes in civil
actions and requires each district to "encourage and promote the use" of
ADR.'
The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have considered and
defined the scope of the confidentiality and evidentiary privileges which are
recognized in the federal courts in a series of cases arising out of actions of
the Office of Independent Counsel. Congress has recognized the importance
of confidentiality in mediation and the other types of ADR.' But whether a
mediation privilege will be adopted in the federal courts in light of the
framework used to determine whether to recognize new claims of evidentiary
privileges set forth in the Independent Counsel and other recent decisions is
either unexplored or much disputed. Clarifying this critical intersection is
the focus of this paper.
At the same time state legislatures and the drafters of the new Uniform
Mediation Act are crafting provisions to define the protections afforded to
confidentiality,' there is little guidance for the federal courts even though it
is likely that mediation and other types of ADR will become more widely
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Ladd Professor of Evidence, Florida State University College of Law; J.D. 1964,
University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to Jean Sternlight who commented on an earlier
draft. This project was supported by a Florida State College of Law research grant. Dawn
Mackland, Jeff Schumm, Bruce Fraser and Mary McCormick provided valuable research
assistance.
I. Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (1998). See Elizabeth Plapinger & Donna
Stienstra, ADR and Settlement in the Federal District Courts 3-4 (1996) (summary of the use
of ADR in federal courts prior to 1996).
2. ADR Act, § 2, 112 Stat. at 2933. See Infra authorities cited in note 1 7, discussing
the importance of protecting the confidentiality of mediation. See also R. Fisher et al.,
Getting to Yes 32-36 (2d ed. 1991).
3. See Richard C. Rueben & Nancy H. Rogers, Choppy Waters, Dispute Resolution
Magazine 4 (Winter 1998).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
used.4 Since mediation is the most frequently used method of ADR in the
federal courts,5 this paper examines the types of protection that are, or should
be, afforded confidential communications in the context of mediation.
Although mediators usually tell the parties that the proceedings are
confidential, the mediators promise does not create an evidentiary privilege
or other protection that will be judicially recognized.6
The significance of the 1998 Act is discussed in Part II of this paper.
Part III examines local rules and standing orders of the United States District
Courts which were enacted prior to the 1998 Act and provide for the
confidentiality, inadmissibility, or privilege of mediation proceedings
conducted in that district's court-based mediation or ADR program. The
local rules adopt at least three approaches. The first type of rule states
mediation proceedings are confidential but does not provide protection
against extra-judicial disclosure through discovery or otherjudicial process.
Another approach treats mediation proceedings as other settlement negotia-
tions which are subject to the evidentiary rule of exclusion when the
evidence of a failed mediation is offered at trial. The final type of protection
found in the local rules recognizes a privilege for mediation proceedings
which protects against both discovery and admissibility at trial.
Since evidence of mediations conducted outside of a district's court-
based program are not protected by most local rules, Part IV examines the
"broad protection" extended to mediation proceedings by Rule 408 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the exclusionary evidentiary rule relating to
offers of settlement and compromise. The applicability of the rule to exclude
evidence of statements made during mediation proceedings as well as the
limitations of Rule 408 are analyzed. Finally, Part V explores whether a
mediation privilege will be recognized under Federal Rule of Evidence 501,
which provides that in federal courts evidentiary privileges will be recog-
nized under the "principles of the common law as interpreted in light of
4. In circuits where there are appellate mediation programs, rules have been adopted
protecting the confidentiality of mediation. See 6th Cir..Bankr. App. Panel R. 8080-2(d)
("Statements made and information exchanged during a pre-argument conference or mediation
are confidential .. "); 3d Cir. Order Establishing Appellate Mediation Program App. VI
("The mediator shall not disclose the substance of mediation session(s), nor report on the
same, to any person or persons. The attorneys are likewise prohibited from disclosing any
substantive information .... ).
5. See Plapinger & Stienstra, supra note 1, at 4.
6. "[Tlhe mere fact that a (client] communication was made in express confidence, or
in the implied confidence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege.... No pledge
of privacy hor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice."
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,682 n.2 1, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 2657 n.21 (1972) (quoting 8 John
H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2286, at 543 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). See In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 923 (8th. Cir. 1997) (Rejecting the argument that
"Mrs. Clinton's reasonable belief that her conversations with White House lawyers were
privileged is sufficient to prevent their disclosure.").
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reason and experience." The paper discusses recent attorney-client privilege
decisions arising out of investigations by the Office of Independent Counsel
as well as the Court's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond which provide a frame
work for analyzing whether a new common law mediation privilege will be
recognized! This secti6n argues that a "common law" mediation privilege
will not be recognized under Federal Rule 501 until empirical data is
developed which supports the public and private interests which are served
by the recognition of a "common law privilege," and there is a clearer
consensus among the federal district courts and the states that a mediation
privilege is necessary and desirable.
II. 1998 ACT
Federal courts have experimented with ADR since the 1970s. Congress
also has encouraged the expansion of court-based ADR. First, it authorized
ten district courts to require the parties to participate in arbitration and an
additional ten districts to offer voluntary arbitration." Subsequently, it
adopted the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA)'0 which required each district
to implement a civil justice and delay reduction plan and recommended ADR
as one of six civil case management principles."
The 1998 ADR Act requires each district court to authorize by local rule
the use of ADR in civil actions. Congress specifically found that ADR may
provide greater satisfaction to the parties, greater efficiency in achieving
settlements and more innovative methods of resolving disputes. The Act also
recognizes that implementation of ADR in the federal courts has the potential
of reducing the large backlog of pending cases and "allowing the courts to
process their remaining cases more efficiently."'
' 2
7. 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
8. Although there are a number of ethical issues which surround the mediator and the
lawyers participating in the mediation, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 651-658 (1998). See Plapinger & Stienstra, supra note I, at 3-4.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 471-482 (1997). Although the CJRA sunset on December I, 1997, the
section authorizing plans appears to remain in effect. Pub. L. No. 105-53, II Stat. 1173
(1997).
11. See Michael A. Perino, Drafting Mediation Privileges: Lessons from the Civil
Justice Reform Act, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. I (1995).
12. ADR Act, § 2, 112 Stat. at 2993. For discussion of additional values of mediation,
see Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator For? "': Mediation's "Value-
Added"for Negotiators, 12 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Bush, What Do
We Need a Mediator For?); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute
Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 12
(1989-90) [hereinafter Bush, Mediation and Adjudication]; Alan Kirtley, The Mediation
Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege
Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J.
Disp. Resol. 1, 10 (1995); Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Mediation: Law, Policy and
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The ADR process is defined as including any process or procedure in
which a neutral third party participates to assist in the resolution of the
issues. The Act includes early neutral evaluation, mediation, minitrial and
arbitration as processes which a district court may elect to require. At least
one of the enumerated processes must be provided to all litigants in civil
cases. District courts are specifically directed to "consider including
mediation" within their local ADR program. 3 Mediation was the primary
ADR process that existed in the federal courts prior to the 1998 Act.'
4
Mediation is a consensual process in which a third person, i.e. a
mediator, helps disputing parties negotiate to achieve a mutually agreeable
settlement." Congress recognized that confidentiality is crucial to successful
mediations 6 because it encourages frank and full discussions and is
necessary to assist the neutral mediator and the parties to identify interests,
develop solutions and reach agreement. 17 The Act requires each district by
local rule to "provide for the confidentiality of the alternative dispute
resolution processes and to prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute
resolution communications.'.
III. LOCAL RULES AND STANDING ORDERS
Even before the implementation of the 1998 Act, most federal district
courts had implemented some form of court-based alternative dispute
resolution program by the adoption of a local rule or a standing order. 9 The
remainder of districts will do so in the near future as the result of the
directive in the 1998 Act to adopt a court-based program. The districts which
have enacted a program have not followed a single model but rather adopted
the court-based ADR process that would best fit its jurisdiction.2 °0 Most of
Practice 20-28 (2d ed. 1994). See infra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
13. ADR Act, § 2(3), 112 Stat. 2993.
14. See Plapinger & Stienstra, supra note 1, at 4.
15. Rogers & McEwen, supra note 12, at § 1.01.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1997).
17. See Kirtley, supra note 12, at 8-10; Irene Stanley Said, The Mediator's Dilemma:
The Legal Requirements Exception to Confidentiality under the Texas ADR Statute, 36S. Tex.
L. Rev. 579,590 (1995); James M. Assey, Jr., Mum's the Word on Mediation: Confidentiality
and Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 991 (1996); Michael L. Prigoff,
Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation, 12 Seton Hall Legis.
J. 1, 1-2 (1988); Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 Ohio St. J. on
Disp. Resol. I (1986); Rogers & McEwen, supra note 12, at ch. 9.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 652 (1997).
19. See Plapinger & Stienstra, supra note 1, at 3-4 for a discussion of the development
of ADR in the federal district courts. ADR was also encouraged by The Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, which recommends ADR as one of six civil case management principles.
20. See id. at 15, Table I for the range and number of court-based programs established
in the district courts.
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the districts which adopted a program included a provision relating to
confidentiality of the process conducted pursuant to that standing order or
rule.2' These rules do not provide protection for mediation proceedings
conducted outside the district's court-based program, whether mediation was
in conjunction with a state-court proceeding or as voluntary pre-suit
mediation in a matter which is subsequently litigated in federal court.
There is no commonality or uniformity in the confidentiality provisions
adopted by the districts as a part of their local ADR program. Some confidential-
ity rules apply only to the specific type of ADR approved in the district, such as.
early neutral evaluation,' arbitration,' summary jury trial,' judicially hosted
21. Seeld.at7l-307.
22. N.D. Cal. ADR L.R. 5-13(a) ("The court ... extends to all . . .communications
(during ENE] all the protection afforded by FREvid 408.... In addition .... the court hereby
prohibits disclosure of any written or oral communication made by any party.... during any
ENE session .... Nor may such communication .... (be] used for any purpose, including
impeachment, in any pending or future proceeding in this court."); D.C. Civil Justice Expense
and Delay Reduction Plan App. D(Vil)(B) ("No communication made in connection with or
during any ENE session may be disclosed or used for any purpose in any pending or future
proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia."); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.12-
8(l) ("Early Neutral Evaluation is regarded as a settlement procedure and is confidential and
private. No participant may disclose, without consent of the other parties, any confidential
information acquired during the ENE session."); N.D. Ohio L.R. 16.5(h) ("The entire E.N.E.
process is confidential. The parties and the Evaluator shall not disclose information regarding
the process, including settlement terms, to the Court or to third persons. . . ."); Vt. L.R.
16.3(k)(1 ) ("All written and oral communications made in connection with or during the ENE
[Early Neutral Evaluation] process are confidential. The ENE process is treated as a
settlement negotiation under Fed. R. Evid. 408.").
23. M.D. Fla. R. 8.06 (In a trial de novo following an arbitration proceeding, "the Court
shall not admit evidence that there has been an arbitration proceeding.... or any other matter
concerning the conduct of the arbitration proceeding, except that testimony given at an
arbitration hearing may be used for any purpose otherwise permitted by the Federal Rules of
Evidence"); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.7-5(e) ("no transcript of the [arbitration) proceeding shall be
admissible in evidence at any subsequent de novo trial of the action."); N.D. Ohio L.R.
16.7(l)(2) ("The assigned Judge shall not admit at the trial de novo any evidence that there has
been an arbitration proceeding. . . unless: (A) The evidence would otherwise be admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence."); S.D. Ohio Order 85-1 (11.1) ("no evidence shall be
received that there had been an arbitration proceeding.., any statement of a party or a witness
may be used in the same manner as permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence."); E.D. Pa.
Civ. R. 53.2(7)(C) (Evidence of an arbitration proceeding is inadmissible "unless the evidence
would otherwise be admissible in the Court under the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
24. D. Mass. R. 4.03(c)(4) ("Neither the [summary jury trial) panel's advisory opinion
nor its verdict, nor the presentations of the parties shall be admissible as evidence in any
subsequent proceeding, unless otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence."); E.D. Okla.
Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan IV(B)(4) ("Neither the panel's advisory
opinion nor its verdict, nor the presentation of the parties, shall be admissible as evidence in
any subsequent proceedings, unless otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence."); W.D.
Wash. Cv. R. 39.1 (e)(6) ("(T]he proceedings [of a summary jury trial] will not be reported
or recorded, and will remain confidential.").
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settlement conference, 2 and mediation.' Other districts apply a general confidenti-
ality provision to all ADR proceedings conducted in the district's court-based
programs. By contrast, there is no confidentiality provision in the programs
adopted in a few districts.28
25. E.D. N.C. R. 30.00 ("During the [court-hosted] settlement conference, the settlement
Judge [and the] . . . parties [may confer] . . . with the specific understanding that any
conversation relative to settlement will not constitute an admission and will not be used in any
form in the litigation .... ); E.D. Okla. L.R. 16.3 ("The Settlement Judge may elect to have
the parties and/or corporate representatives meet alone without the presence of the Settlement
Judge or counsel with the specific understanding that any conversation relative to settlement
will not constitute an admission, and will not be used in any form in the litigation"); N.D.
Okla. Civ. R. 16.3(E) ("Any statement made in the context of the settlement conference will
not constitute an admission and will not be used in any form in the litigation"); E.D. Tenn L.R.
68.3(h) ("Settlement discussions [during judicially hosted settlement conferences] are
confidential as provided by Rule 408, Fed. R. Evid."); M.D. Tenn. L.R. 22(d)(3) ("No part of
any of the contents of the discussions or any statements made or information provided to the
Court and/or to any other party or counsel during a [judicially hosted] settlement conference
shall be used by any party... in the litigation.... This protection includes, but is not limited
to, the protection provided by Rules 408 and 409 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."); Wyo.
Civ. R. 16.3 (c)(5) ("Any memoranda submitted pursuant to this rule [at a judicially hosted
settlement conference] shall be treated by the person conducting the settlement conference as
confidential.").
26. M.D. Pa. L.R. 16.8.6 ((c) "All proceedings at any mediation session authorized by
this rule... shall not be used by any adverse party for any reason in the litigation at issue....
(f) The mediator shall not be called as a witness at trial."); W.D. Pa. L.R 16.3.5(E) ("All
counsel and parties shall treat as confidential all written and oral communications made in
connection with or during any [mediation] conference and no such communications may be
disclosed to anyone not involved in the litigation. Nor may any such communication be used
for any purpose (including impeachment) in the civil action or in any other proceedings.");
D. Neb. L. R. 53.2(d)(4) ("The mediation session(s) constitute settlement negotiations.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 408, Fed. R. Evid., all statements, whether written or
oral, made only during the course of the mediation proceeding shall be deemed to be
confidential and shall not be admissible in evidence for any reason in the trial of the case");
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 83.11-5(4) ("Mediation is regarded as a settlement procedure and is
confidential and private. No participant may disclose, without the consent of the other parties,
any confidential information acquired during mediation."); E.D.N.C. R. 32.07(h) ("All
proceedings of the mediated settlement conference, including any statement by any party...,
shall, in all respects, be privileged.").
27. E.D. Mo. Order 98-504 R. 16-6.04 ("A neutral may exclude all persons other than the
parties and their counsel from ADR conferences. All written and oral communications made
or disclosed to the neutral are confidential and may not be disclosed .... The neutral shall
not testify regarding matters disclosed during ADR proceedings."); W.D. N.C. Civil Justice
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan Section Four (111)(C) ("ADR proceedings and information
relating to or disclosed during those proceedings shall be governed by Rule 408 ofthe Federal
Rules of Evidence. A neutral may not be deposed or called as a witness... at any subsequent
proceeding"); W.D. Tex. R. CV-88(g) ("[A] communication relating to the subject matter of
any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution
procedure .... is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence
against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding.").
28. See N.D. Ind. L. R. 53.2; Ky. (E.D. and W.D.), Perino, supra note 11, at 17.
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Similarly, the local rules provide differently for the extent of the protection
given confidentiality.29 Some districts simply provide the process is confidential
In Louisiana, the three district courts have adopted Uniform Local Rules of the United
States District Courts for the Eastern, Middle, and Western Districts of Louisiana. Prior to
the enactment of the 1998 ADR Act, these uniform local rules did not contain provisions
relating to mediation or ADR. On June 2, 1999, the Uniform Local Rules for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana were amended by adding L.R. 16.3.1E
which deals with ADR and specifically provides in Section (d) that "All alternative dispute
resolution proceedings shall be confidential."
The Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan for the Eastern District and the Civil
Justice Reform Act Plan adopted by the Middle District both provide that the presiding
judicial officer has the authority to refer cases to ADR; the plans do not contain any specific
provisions concerning ADR or mediation and do not contain a provision relating the
confidentiality of the ADR proceeding. See Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 2 Federal Local Court
Rules (2d ed. West 1997 and Supp. Feb. 1998); Civil Justice Reform Act Plan of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, 2 Federal Local Court Rules (2d ed.
West 1997 and Supp. Feb. 1998). Section IV of the Civil Justice Reform Act Plan of the
Western District provides that the court "encourages alternative dispute resolution" but that
"the court will not establish formal procedures for arbitration or mediation." Sec. IV, Civil
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan of the United States District Court for the Easern
District of Louisiana, 2 Federal Local Court Rules (2d ed. West 1997 and Supp. Feb. 1998).
The Eastern District entered an order on December 8, 1997 adopting the Fifth Circuit Model
Equal Employment Opportunity and Employment Dispute Resolution Plan which contains a
provision authorizing the mediation of a claim under the Plan and setting forth detailed
procedures. Section 6.B.4 of Chapter IX provides: "Any person or party involved in the
mediation process shall not disclose, in whole or in part, any information or records obtained
through, or prepared specifically for, the mediation process, except as necessary to consult
with the parties or their representatives, and then only with notice to all parties."
An internet webpage of the Middle District entitled: "Mediation in the Middle District,"
provides that in order to establish mediation in the Middle District the parties must execute
a confidentiality agreement in which they agree that nothing said during the mediation shall
be admissible at trial, disclosures during private meetings are confidential and that no
subpoena shall issue to the mediator requesting testimony. Mediation in the Middle District
(visited Jul. 1, 1999) <http://www.lamd.uscourts.gov/mediation.htm>. The Clerk of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana distributes a mediation
packet which requires the parties who choose mediation to execute the confidentiality
agreement. There are no local rules or standing orders cited with respect to this provision and
apparently no Middle District local rule or standing order has been promulgated requiring the
confidentiality agreement.
29. The federal courts have been reluctant to interpret a statute as creating an evidentiary
privilege in the absence of clear statutory language. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d
487 (5th Cir. 1998) (In rejecting the argument that the Agriculture Credit Act which requires
that the mediation sessions be "confidential" created a privilege, the court reasoned that there
was no showing of clear manifestation that Congress intended to create a privilege.); Martin
v. Lamb, 122 F.R.D. 143, 146 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (Statute providing that police personnel
records were "confidential" did not create an evidentiary privilege. "Merely asserting that a
state statute declares that the records in question are 'confidential' does not make out a
sufficient claim that the records are 'privileged' within the meaningof Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
and Fed. R. Evid. 501."); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 682 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
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without defining any additional protections;" other districts provide that evidence
concerning the mediation or ADR is inadmissible;"' still others specifically
(Provision of Consumer Product' Safety Act providing that certain information "shall be
considered confidential and shall not be disclosed" did not create an evidentiary privilege and
was subject to discovery in a civil proceeding.). See Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., No. 95-
2806, 1999 WL 909731 n.15 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1999).
Statutes providing for confidentiality are "concerned with extrajudicial disclosures;
privilege is concerned with disclosure in court. For example, a lawyer is under a duty of
confidentiality which makes him liable to disciplinary sanctions and monetary damages if he
reveals his client's secrets. The client has a privilege to prevent disclosure of confidential
communications in the courtroom." Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5437 n. 15 (1980). The duty of confidentiality is broader
than the protection of an evidentiary privilege. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C.
Kirkpartick, Modem Evidence § 5.2, at 434 (1995).
30. M.D. Ala. L.R. 16.2(a) ("The court stresses that mediation is completely voluntary
and confidential. The court strictly enforces the confidentiality of mediation."); P.R. Civil
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan R. V(D) ("This process [alternative dispute
resolution/mediation] shall take place in the strictest confidentiality."); N.D. Tex. Civil
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan Ill(F) ("All communications made during ADR
procedures are confidential and protected from disclosure and do not constitute a waiver of
any existing privileges and immunities."); S.D. Tex. L.R. 20(1) ("All communications made
during ADR procedures are confidential and protected from disclosure and do not constitute
a waiver of any existing privileges and immunities."); W.D. Wash. Cv. R. 39.1 (e)(6) ("[T]hc
proceedings (of a summary jury trial] will not be reported or recorded, and will remain
confidential."); Wyo. Civ. R. 16.3 (c)(5) ("Any memoranda submitted pursuant to this rule [at
a judicially hosted settlement conference] shall be treated by the person conducting the
settlement conference as confidential.").
31. D. Ariz. L.R. 2.11 (i)(8) ("[E]xcept as related to impeachment of a witness, no
transcript of the [arbitration] proceedings shall be admissible in evidence at any subsequent
trial de novo of the action."); C.D. Cal. Order 98-2 7.5 ("[AII settlement proceedings shall
be confidential and no statement made therein shall be admissible in any proceeding in the
case."); D.C. Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan App. C(IV) ("A. Confidentiality
will be ensured throughout the mediation process. . . . C. No papers generated by the
mediation process will be included in Court files, and information about what transpires
during mediation sessions will not at any time be made known to the Court."); D. Kan. R. 16.3
("Settlement conference [including mediation] statements or memoranda submitted to the
court or any other communications which take place during the settlement conference shall
not be used by any party in the trial of the case.)"; M.D.N.C. L.R. 83. 1 0(e) ("At the beginning
of the mediated settlement conference, the mediator shall describe the following matters to the
parties: (7) The inadmissibility of negotiating statements and offers at trial."); E.D. Pa. Civ.
R. 53.2.1(5)(e) ("[Nlothing communicated during the mediation process shall be placed in
evidence, made known to the trial court or jury, or construed for any purpose as an admis-
sion."); M.D. Pa. L.R. 16.8.6 ((c) "All proceedings at any mediation session authorized by this
rule.., shall not be used by any adverse party for any reason in the litigation at issue.... (f)
The mediator shall not be called as a witness at trial."); W.D. Pa. L.R. 16.3.5(E) ("All counsel
and parties shall treat as confidential all written and oral communications made in connection
with or during any [mediation] conference and no such communications may be disclosed to
anyone not involved in the litigation. Nor may any such communication be used for any
purpose (including impeachment) in the civil action or in any other proceedings."); D. Neb.
L. R. 53.2(d)(4) ("The mediation session(s) constitute settlement negotiations. Notwithstand-
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provide that evidence of the mediation is inadmissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 40832 or is privileged." Still other district's local rules are not
ing the provisions of Rule 408, Fed. R. Evid., all statements, whether written or oral,made
only during the course of the mediation proceeding shall be deemed to be confidential and
shall not be admissible in evidence for any reason in the trial of the case."); D. S.C. Civ. R.
16.07(C) ("Communications during the mediation conference shall be confidential. The
parties, their attorneys and other persons present shall maintain the confidentiality of the
mediation and shall not rely on, introduce or attempt to introduce as evidence in any arbitral,
judicial or other proceeding, any event, document or communication relating in any way to the
mediation."); W.D. Tex. R. CV-88(g) ("[A] communication relating to the subject matter of
any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution
procedure, . . . is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence
against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding."); D. Utah Civ. R 16-3(d)
("If the case does not settle [after ajudicially hosted settlement conference], no oral or written
communication made during the settlement conference may be used in the trial of the case or
for any other purpose."); E.D. Wash. L.R. 16.2(g)(7) ("[N]o transcript of the [arbitration]
proceedings shall be admissible in evidence at any subsequent de novo trial except for
purposes of impeachment.").
32. N.D. Ala. Bankr. R. 9019.2(IV)(B)(I 1) ("[The entire mediation process is
confidential? ... The mediation process must be treated as a compromise negotiation for
purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and State rules of evidence."); Conn. Civ.R.36(5)
("All ADR sessions shall be deemed confidential and protected by the provisions of Fed. R.
Evid. 408 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 68."); N.D. Ga. L.R. 16.7(L) ("The ADR process must be treated
as a compromise negotiation for purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Georgia rules
of evidence. The ADR neutral is disqualified as a witness,.., in any pending or future action
relating to the dispute . . . ."); W.D. Mich. L. R. 16.2 (e) ("All ADR proceedings are
considered to be compromise negotiations within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 408."); W.D.
Pa. L. R.16.2.8(C) (Evidence relating to arbitration proceeding is inadmissible "unless the
evidence would otherwise be admissible in the court under the Federal Rules of Evidence.");
E.D. Tenn. L.R. 16.4(h) ("The Mediation Conference and all proceedings relating thereto...
, are confidential and are inadmissible to the same extent as discussions of compromise and
settlement are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408."); M.D. Tenn. L.R. 27 ("All
ADR proceedings under these Rules and matters relating thereto. . . ,are deemed confidential
and are inadmissible as evidence to the same extent as discussions of compromise and
settlement are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408."); D. Utah R. ADR Plan(6)(i)
("All proceedings in any mediation conference conducted under this plan, including any
statement by any party, attorney or representative, are conclusively deemed to be made in
compromise negotiations within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 408."); N.D. W.Va. L.R. Civ.
P. 5.01(e) ("Mediation shall be regarded as confidential settlement negotiations, subject to
Rule 408 of the Federal Rule of Evidence.").
33. E.D. Cal. L.R. 16-271(g) ("The Court extends to all . . .communications [made
during ENE] all the protections federal courts and Federal Rule of Evidence 408 give to
communications made in settlement negotiations or to offers of compromise. In addition, no
communication made during any session may be disclosed by the parties,. . . or used for any
purpose (including impeachment or to prove bias or prejudice of a witness) in any pending or
future proceeding in this Court."); N.D. Cal. ADR L.R. 6-11 (a) ("The court hereby extends
to all. .. communications [during mediation] all the protection afforded by [Fed. R. Evid.)
408 .... In addition, the court hereby prohibits disclosure of any written or oral communica-
tion made by any party ... during any mediation [session] to anyone not involved in the




The confidentiality provisions in the local rules apply to ADR proceedings
held pursuant to the district's local rule and order. Usually, these confidentiality
provisions do not protect ADR proceedings held outside that district's court-based
ADR process. For example, if a federal grand jury subpoenaed evidence relating
impeachment, in any pending or future proceeding in this court."); S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 16.3(h)
("The [mandatory] settlement conference will be off the record, privileged and confidential,
..."); M.D. Fla. R. 9.07(b) ("All proceedings of the mediation conference,. .. are privileged
in all respects."); S.D. Fla. General R. 16.2(G)(2) ("All proceedings of the mediation
conference .... are privileged in all respects."); N.D. Ill. General R. 5.10 (C) ("All mediation
proceedings, . . . shall, in all respects, be privileged .. "); E.D. N.C. R. 32.07(h) ("All
proceedings of the mediated settlement conference, including any statement by any party....
shall, in all respects, be privileged. .. ."); N.D. N.Y. R. 83.11-5(4) ("Mediation is regarded
as a settlement procedure and is confidential and private. No participant may disclose,
without consent of the other parties, any confidential information acquired during media-
tion."); D. Mass. R. 4.03(d)(6) ("Mediation proceedings shall be regarded as settlement
proceedings and any communication related to the subject matter of the dispute made during
the mediation ... shall be a confidential communication. No admission, . . . or other
confidential communication made in setting up or conducting the proceedings not otherwise
discoverable or obtainable shall be admissible as evidence or subject to discovery."); E.D.
Wash. L.R. 16.2(d)(3) ("All proceedings of the mediation conference, including any statement
made by any party,. . . shall ... be privileged and not ... made known to the trial court or
jury."); W.D. Wash. Civ. R. 39.1(C)(5) ("All proceedings of the mediation conference,
including any statement made by any party .... shall. . . . be privileged and not ... made
known to the trial court .. "); S.D. W.Va. L.R. Civ. P. 5.01 (f) ("All proceedings of the
mediation conference, including any statement made by any party,.. . shall be privileged and
not ...made known to the assigned judicial officer .. "); D. Or. R. 16.4(d)(1) ("All
proceedings of the mediation conference.... will, in all respects, be privileged ... ").
The Plan for Alternative Dispute Resolution and Settlement Procedures and Rules of
Practice for the Western District of Oklahoma in Local Civil Rule 16.3 provides for mediation,
ENE, arbitration, summary jury trial and summary bench trial. Each process is protected by
the following language: "The Court extends to all such communications all the protection
afforded by Rule 408 Federal Rules of Evidence and by Rule 68 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition, unless otherwise stipulated by all parties and the ... [neutral], the
Court prohibits disclosure of any written or oral communication made... in connection with
or during any ... [ADR] session to anyone not involved in the litigation. Nor may such...
communication, absent stipulation by all parties and the mediator, be disclosed ... or used
for any purpose, . .. in any pending or future proceeding in this Court." W.D. Okla. L. Civ.
R. 16.3 Supp. § 3.7.
34. 5th Cir. Model Equal Employment Opportunity and Employment Dispute Resolution
Plan, Ch. IX, § 6(B)(4) ("Any person or party involved in the mediation process shall not
disclose .... any information or records obtained through, or prepared specifically for, the
mediation process, except as necessary to consult with the parties or their representatives, and
then only with notice to all parties."); V.I. Civ. R. 3.2(c)(1) ("The mediator has a duty to
define and describe the process of mediation ... during-an orientation session with the parties
before the mediation process begins. The orientation should include the following: D. The
confidentiality provision as provided for by Title 5, Section 854 of the Virgin Islands Code
[attorney-client privilege]."); E.D. Wis. R. 7.12 ("Any documentation or proposal submitted




to a mediation which occurred in connection with a state court proceeding, the
confidentiality provisions of the district's local rules are not applicable.
The 1998 Act authorized each district by local rule to provide for the
confidentiality of the ADR process and "to prohibit disclosure of confidential
dispute resolution communications."" The statutory language does not clearly
grant the authority to the district courts either to promulgate new testimonial
privileges or to expand the protections of Federal Rule of Evidence 408. The local
rules adopted prior to the 1998 Act, as well as those that are adopted subsequently,
cannot be inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the rules of practice and
procedure for the federal courts. 6 Although the Civil Justice Reform Act may
validate the local rules relating to confidentiality, it is doubtful that individual
district courts were granted the authority, as each saw fit, to create new evidentiary
privileges through the local rule-making power." Federal Rule of Evidence 501
provides that the only exceptions to the recognition of evidentiary privileges "under
the principles of the common law" are those embodied in the Constitution, federal
statute or rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
In addition to being inconsistent, poorly drafted and sometimes confusing, the
local rules demonstrate that there is no consensus among the district courts as to the
extent of the protection afforded mediation and other forms of court-based ADR.
The local rules may serve as a trap for the unwary practitioner from outside the
district who mediates in a court-based program. Counsel may make the misguided
assumption that the foreign district's rule relating to confidentiality is the same as
the district in which counsel normally practices. Significant variance in the
provisions of local rules dealing with the same issue is poor public policy.
Even if local rules clearly and uniformly state the extent of the protection given
confidentiality of mediation, the protection is limited to federal district court-based
programs. Voluntary or pre-suit mediations are not protected by the local rule.
Neither is evidence of mediation proceedings in state courts.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 652 (1997).
36. See Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992); Carver v. Bunch, 946
F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1991); Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1987); James W.
Moore, 14 Moore's Federal Practice § 83.04 (3d ed. 1994); Charles Allen Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3152-3153 (1999).
37. See Wright et al., supra note 36, at § 3152 ("[Tlhe CJRA should not bear on the
validity of local rules adopted pursuant to Rule 83."). In ruling on whether a federal court-
sponsored mediation proceeding was confidential in a subsequent motion to set aside a
mediation agreement, a magistrate judge in Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., No. 95-2806,
1999 WL 909731 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1999), indicated that "It is not likely that Congress [in
enacting the ADR Act] intended to give 94 district courts the power to vary in potentially quite
different ways the proviso in Rule 501." Id. at *10. The judge further opined that: "[E]ven
when a local rule adopted by a federal district court pursuant to § 652(d) offers more
protection to mediation communications than would be offered by the law of the state where
the district court sits, the federal court must apply state privilege law when state substantive
law is the source of the rule ofdecision on the claim to which the proffered evidence from the
mediation is relevant." Id. at '13.
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IV. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 408
A. Generally
-The policy of fostering free and frank discussions in negotiations which lead
to settlement and compromise of actions prior to trial is recognized in Federal Rule
of Evidence 408.38 Offering or accepting or promising to offer or accept a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim is not
admissible to prove liability for the claim. Rule 408 not only protects against the
admission of offers of settlement and compromise but also prohibits the admission
of statements or admissions of fact which are made during settlement discussions. 9
Many jurisdictions at common law limited the protection of the exclusionary
rule only to the offers of settlement themselves and not to statements of fact or
admissions of fault which were made during the settlement negotiations. However,
the drafters of the Federal Rules rejected this distinction on the basis that such a
limitation in Rule 408 would hamper "free communication between parties." There
would be "an unjustifiable restraint upon efforts to negotiate settlements" and that
continuing to recognize this distinction would be "a preference for the sophisti-
cated, and a trap for the unwary.
'P40
Two theories have provided a rationale for the rule that offers of settlement
and compromise are inadmissible on the issue of liability for the underlying claim. 4
38. Rule 408 has been codified without substantial amendment in 38 states. Jack B.
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 6 Weinstein's Federal Evidence (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed.,
2d ed. 1998) (Listing in Table of State and Military Adaptations).
39. See Wright & Graham, supra note 29, §§ 5301-5315; Michael Graham, Handbook
of Federal Evidence § 408.1 (4th ed. 1996).
40. S. Rep. No. 93-1277 at 10(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,7056. The
Department of Justice opposed this amendment claiming that the proposed rule would require
the exclusion of admissions of fact made during settlement negotiations. Proposed Rules of
Evidence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 345 (1973). The department argued that it would immunize statements
admitted to government investigators during what a court may later characterize as a
settlement negotiation rather than an investigation. Thus, the proposed rule would further
perjury if citizens could deny what was admitted or could make false representations without
fear of impeachment.
The "trap for the unwary" justification flowed from many courts applying the common law
rule drawing a distinction between an admission of fact made during negotiations for
compromise and an admission of fact that was stated hypothetically: "Admitting for the sake
of this discussion only." The former were admissible against the party making them; the latter
were protected from admission. Only the sophisticated or those represented by counsel were
aware of the distinction and phrased their statements accordingly. In rejecting this distinction,
the Advisory Committee noted that: "An inevitable result [of the common law rule] is to
inhibit freedom of communication with respect to compromise even among lawyers." Fed. R.
Evid. 408 advisory committee's notes.
41. Morley-Murphy Co. v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 910 F. Supp. 450, 456 (W.D. Wis.
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Wigmore's view is that an offer of compromise is not motivated from a belief that
the adversary's claim is well-founded but rather a desire for peace.4 Therefore, he
argues that the offer of compromise is not relevant because it does not signify an
admission. There is no express or implied concession by a party when a offer is
made. 3
Most modem commentators argue that the justification for the rule excluding
offers of compromise is not relevance, but one of evidentiary privilege." This
rationale recogizes the strong public policy favoring negotiated dispute resolution
requires that offers of compromise be made without fear the offer will be used
against the offeror.4 '
The protections of Rule 408 to encourage free communication are available in
all settlement and compromise negotiations. They include the traditional informal
settlement discussions which occur between parties and counsel. The protection
is applicable to all types of alternative dispute resolution, regardless of whether the
jurisdiction additionally recognizes an additional protection for mediation; e.g. a
local rule of a federal district court or a statute creating a privilege for mediation
proceedings. Rule 408 applies regardless of whether some more specific protection
is applicable. In other words, if a court determines that a testimonial mediation
privilege will not be recognized or is not applicable, Rule 408 may still bar the
evidence when it is offered at trial.
No specific statute or court-rule is necessary for Rule 408 to be applicable in
mediation proceedings, regardless of whether the mediation is voluntary or court-
ordered. Mediations involve statements made during attempts to settle or
1996).
42. 4 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1061, at 36 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
43. Wigmore's theory focuses on the motivation of the party who makes the statement.
However, as McCormick reasons, this theory may be applicable to offers by a party asserting
an unfounded defense, but is inapplicable to a party who offers to pay ninety percent of an
asserted claim. See Charles T. McCormick, Evidence § 76, at 158 (1954). In the latter
situation, it is reasonable to assume that the party making the offers believes the adversary's
claim is well-founded. Moreover, offers of compromise meet the modern theory of relevancy
expressed in Federal Rule 401. The issue is whether evidence of the offer has some logical
tendency to prove a material fact and are relevant. Any offer of compromise might reasonably
suggest to the finder-of-fact that the party making the offer believed the opponent's position
had substantial merit. The fact-finder can weigh this evidence together with the other
evidence, and accept or reject it.
44. Wright & Graham, supra note 29, § 5302, at 170-73; 2 Weinstein & Berger, supra
note 38, at 408; McCormick on Evidence 72.1 at 271 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
Another rationale which has gained little acceptance in this country is to treat the matter as
one of express or implied contract. For cases accepting this rationale, see Gibbs v. Johnson,
10 F. Cas. 297, 300 (C.C.D.C. 1860) and Sommerville Water Co. v. Borough of Sommervile,
78 A. 793,794 (N.J.Ch. 1911). If an offer of compromise was made which included the words
"without prejudice" a unilateral implied contract is created which provides that the offer was
not admissible in evidence. See Wright & Graham, supra note 29, § 5302, at 169, 171-72.
45. See Mclnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1985); Wright & Graham, supra
note 29, § 5302, at 170.
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compromise a claim. However, some district court local rules46 as well as some
states have specifically adopted a provision which applies Rule 408 to mediation
proceedings, probably as a reminder to counsel and the parties.47
B. Inapplicability
Rule 408 precludes the admission at trial of evidence of settlement negotia-
tions which are offered to prove liability for the underlying claim"4 The second
sentence of Rule 408 cautions that documents presented during settlement
negotiations are not protected simply because they were so presented. In other
words, the rule is not a shield behind which one can divulge pre-existing
documents during settlement discussions or negotiations and have them protected
from admissibility during trial.
The rule does not prohibit discovery of matters pertaining to the settlement
negotiations. 9 However, because a party is aware of the statements made by the
opponent during the negotiations or the joint sessions, the availability of discovery
46. See supra notes 25-27.
47. Vt. R. Evid. 408 ("Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations, including mediation, is likewise not admissible."); Ind. R. Evid. 408
("Compromise negotiations encompass alternative dispute resolution."); Me. R. Evid. 408(a)("Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations or in mediation is also
not admissible on any substantive issue in dispute between the parties.").
48. See Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 909 (2d Cir. 1997);
Uforma/Shelby Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, I I F.3d 1284, 1293-94 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Hauert, 40 F.3d 197, 199-200 (7th Cir. 1994).
Rule 408 is inapplicable when there is not a dispute as to the validity or amount of the
underlying claim. See In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 701 F.2d 1071, 1074 (2d Cir. 1983) (in
bankruptcy proceeding, proper to admit statement by president of bankrupt corporation
acknowledging accuracy of claims because at the time of negotiation the corporation did not
dispute claim in question but simply sought more time for payment).
49. See NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 612 F.
Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Although the intent of FRE 408 is to foster settlement
negotiations, the sole means used to effectuate that end is a limitation on the admission of
evidence produced during settlement negotiations for the purpose of proving liability at trial.
It was never intended to be a broad discovery privilege."); Peter N. Thompson, Confidential-
ity, Competency and Confusion: The Uncertain Promise of the Mediation Privilege in
Minnesota, 18 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 329 (1997); Rogers & McEwen, supra note 12, at
§ 9:07.
A confidentiality clause in a settlement agreement followed by a court-order may not
prevent a third party from discovery of information that the parties to the agreement agreed
not to disclose. Datapoint Corp. v. Picturetel Corp., No. 93-2381, 1998 WL5 1356 (N.D.Tex.,
Jan. 23, 1998); Barger v. Garden Way, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. App. 1998); Wilson v.
American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11 th Cir. 1985); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 339, 344-46 (3d Cir. 1986). At least one state
has a statutory provision prohibiting the court from entering an order concealing information




is not as significant as it is when the party is unaware of the evidence. Although
Rule 408 does not prohibit discovery of an opponent's communications regarding
negotiation strategies, Rule 26(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedures as well as the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine maybe applicable to protect
these discussions.
Rule 408 is only applicable when the offer of compromise is offered
to prove liability. The final sentence of Rule 408 provides that the rule
does not require the exclusion of evidence relating to settlement offers when
it is offered for another purpose; "such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct
a criminal investigation or prosecution."'" This sentence illustrates some of the
purposes for which the rule would not exclude evidence; it is not an exclusive
listing.52
1. Bias or Prejudice
If a witness testifies during a trial, the cross-examining counsel may attack the
credibility by showing a relevant bias, prejudice or interest." Evidence of a
settlement agreement involving the witness is admissible when it is relevant to
show the bias of the witness when testifying in the instant case. 4 The language of
Rule 408 does not prohibit admission of the evidence since it is not offered to show
the validity or invalidity of the underlying claim. The second sentence of Rule 408
specifically recognizes that evidence of the prior settlement may be admitted to
show bias. The details of the settlement agreement are subject to a Rule 403
balancing, as are the details of other evidence being offered to attack credibility by
showing bias."
50. The rule authorizes the court to enter a protective order "for good cause shown ...
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense." See Assey, supra note 17, at 996; Green, supra note
17, at 25.
51. See United States v. Austin, 54 F.3d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1995); Mclnnis v. A.M.F.,
Inc., 765 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1985).
52. Fed. R. Evid. 408 Advisory Committee's Notes. Maine has amended Rule 408 to
preclude admission of settlement discussions made during family court mediation regardless
of the reason the evidence is offered. Me. R. Evid. 408(b).
53. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S. Ct. 465 (1984). Evidence which is
inadmissible for other purposes may be admissible to show bias. See Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974); John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632,
635 (3d Cir. 1977).
54. See Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. White, 113
F.R.D. 20 (W.D. Ark. 1986).
55. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 50-54, 105 S. Ct. at 468-70.
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2. Act or Wrong Committed During Settlement Negotiations
When the question is not the validity or invalidity of the underlying claim, but
rather a material issue of an act which occurred during the negotiations, Rule 408
does not prohibit the admission of evidence.' For example, when an alleged wrong
is committed during the negotiations; e.g., libel,"7 assault, breach of contract, s8 or
unfair labor practice, 9 the evidence of statements made during negotiations is not
being offered to prove the liability for the underlying claim and is not prohibited.
Wrongful acts are not protected simply because they occurred during settlement
discussion.' The rule excluding settlement offers and discussions was not intended
to be a shield for the commission of independent wrongs." So too, if a suit alleging
that an insurance company failed to make a reasonable settlement within the policy
limits, either the insured or the insurance company can offer evidence of the
settlement offers that were made during the negotiations.' "
3. Impeachment
If a party testifies during the trial, a statement of fact made by the party during
settlement negotiations may be offered as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach
credibility. 3 Applying the literal language of Rule 408, the evidence is not barred
56. Uforma/Shelby Business Forms, Inc. v. NLRB I I I F.3d 1284, 1293-94 (6th Cir.
1997).
57. See Krebs Pigment & Chem. Co. v. Sheridan, 12 F. Supp. 254,256 (E.D. Pa. 1934).
aff'd, 79 F.2d 479 (3d Cit. 1935).
58. See Westchester Specialty Ins. Serv., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 119 F.3d. 1505,1512-
13 (11 th Cit. 1997) (admissible to resolve factual dispute-about the meaning of settlement
agreement's terms); Bituminous Constr., Inc. v. Rucker Enter., Inc., 816 F.2d 965,968-69 (4th
Cit. 1987) (admissible to show Rucker's understanding of its obligations under the agreement
and that Bituminous made demand for payment of the contract).
59. See NLRB v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 406 F.2d 1306, 1313 (1st Cir. 1969).
60. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Reptr. 78,89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)
(Cal. Evid. Code § 1152 does not exclude evidence of intentional infliction of emotional
distress when insurer "embarked upon a concerted course of conduct to induce plaintiff to
surrender his insurance policy or enter into a disadvantageous 'settlement' of a nonexistent
dispute by means of false and threatening letters and the employment of economic pressure
based upon his disabled and, therefore impecunious, condition, (the very thing insured
against) exacerbated by Western National's malicious and bad faith refusal to pay plaintiff's
legitimate claim." Fletcher, 89 Cal. Reptr. at 87.).
61. See Harriman v. Maddocks, 518 A.2d 1027, 1031 (Me. 1986).
62. See White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 318 (Cal. 1985) (admissible to
show breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing); Pattison v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 599 So.
2d 873, 877 (La. App. 4th Cit. 1992) (admissible to show reasonableness of insurer's conduct
handling insured's claims); Gelinas v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 551 A.2d 962,
968 (N.H. 1988) (admissible on issue of negligence in refusal to settle claim within policy
limits).
63. See Wright & Graham, supra note 29, at §§ 5307, 5314.
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because the evidence of the prior statement is not offered to prove the validity or
invalidity of its claim. This interpretation is bolstered by the policy that the rules
of evidence should not be a shield to commit perjury.M On the other hand, if a
party's statements made during settlement negotiations are admissible to impeach
whenever they are inconsistent with the party's trial testimony, the freedom of
discussion in settlement negotiations will be inhibited. The few cases facing this
issue are not in agreement.6' Most commentators assume that there are, at least,
some cases where the interests of justice compel the introduction of prior
inconsistent statements made during settlement discussions.'
64. Fed. R. Evid. 102 ("that the truth may be ascertained"). See Davidson v. Beco Corp.,
733 P.2d 781, 787 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986), modified by 753 P.2d 1253 (Idaho 1987); Missouri
Pac. R. R. Co. v. Arkansas Sheriff's Boys' Ranch, 655 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Ark. 1983) (policy
to "promote complete candor between the parties to the settlement negotiations but not to
protect false representations").
65. Compare EEOC v. Gear Petroleum, Inc., 948 F.2d 1542, 1545-46 (10th Cir. 1991)
(in Age Discrimination suit, court excluded letters from employer's counsel to EEOC stating
that the employee was laid off not only because of general reduction in force but also because
the employee was "moving toward mandatory retirement at age 65" to use to impeach because
they were made in the context of settlement negotiations) and Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121
F.R.D. 9, 12 n.l (D. Mass. 1988) (believing that the First Circuit "would not allow the
admission of statements made at compromise negotiations even for impeachment purposes
because in the usual case, an analysis of both nature of the claims in a case and the content of
the purported statements would lead to the conclusion that such impeachment evidence would
be nothing more than 'camouflaged' evidence on liability") with County of Hennepin v. AFG
Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 149, 153 (8th Cir. 1984) (in county's action against builder's insurer
and manufacturer of glass windows to determine cause of damage to curtain wall windows in
county government center, evidence of county's settlement with insurer on claim of similar
items as damages against manufacturer was admissible to impeach assertions that county had
received windfall in amount of $425,000 for $83,000 claim against insurer for storm damage
unrelated to curtain wall windows).
66. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 29, § 4.29, at 405-06 ("Statements made in the
course of settlement discussions should be admitted for impeachment only in egregious
circumstances where the interests ofjustice compel their introduction. If the statements are
admitted, the fact that they were made in the course of settlement negotiations should be
withheld from the jury."); Stephen A. Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of
Evidence Manual 191 (3d ed. 1982) (except where a non-party is being impeached, courts
should "decide against admitting statements made during settlement negotiations as
impeachment evidence"); Jon R. Waltz & J. Patrick Huston, The Rules of Evidence in
Settlement. 5.1 Litigation 11, 16 (1978) (Courts should "almost never" admit compromise
evidence to impeach.). But see Graham, supra note 39, § 408. 1, at 438 ("[Sltatements made
during compromise negotiations should not be admissible as inconsistent statements to
impeach.").
Federal Rule 408 and the Advisory Committee Notes are silent on this issue. The
significance of this silence is unclear because of the specific treatment under other Federal
Rules of Evidence of otherwise inadmissible evidence offered as prior inconsistent statements.
Rule 407, which generally prohibits the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures which
are offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct, specifically enumerates "impeachment"
as one of the permissible purposes for which evidence of subsequent remedial measures is
admissible. Thus, it can be argued that Congress' failure to include "impeachment" as a
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When Rule 408 is applied to evidence of statements by the parties or counsel
during mediation proceedings, it does not prohibit discovery but does prohibit
evidence which is offered at trial to prove liability or the absence of liability for the
claim. However, when a statement of a party is offered to prove a material issue
other than liability, the evidence is not excluded. For example, if it is asserted that
a mediation agreement was the result of duress which occurred during the
mediation proceeding, Rule 408 would not prohibit the testimony of the witnesses
to what occurred. So too, if a mediation between a witness and a party resulted in
a settlement which required the witness to testify in favor of the party in another
action, Rule 408 does not bar the admission of the settlement agreement. In at least
a few cases, statements made during a mediation may be admissible as prior
inconsistent statements to impeach a witness who testifies during a trial to material
facts which are inconsistent with what the party stated during the mediation. Even
through Rule 408 does not protect certain statements made during mediation, a
district court's local rule may protect confidentiality.
V. MEDIATION PRIVILEGE
A. Federal Statutory Privilege
Currently, there is no federal statute recognizing a general mediation privilege
which can be asserted to prohibit the introduction of evidence relating to mediation
proceedings. However, a few federal statutes recognize that in specific types of
actions or proceedings mediations are confidential 7 or privileged.6" As a part of
permissible purpose for evidence otherwise excluded by Rule 408 indicates its intent that
evidence of statements made during settlement negotiations is not admissible as a prior
inconsistent statement.
Federal Rule 410 which generally prohibits the admission of plea negotiations which occur
in criminal prosecutions specifically provides that the evidence is not admissible for any
purpose other than the two enumerated. It can be argued that if Congress had intended
statements made during settlement negotiations to be inadmissible as prior inconsistent
statements it would have adopted language in Rule 408 similar to that language in Rule 410.
Recognizing this uncertainty, Tennessee has added a sentence to Tennnessee Rule of
Evidence 408 which specifically states that "a party may not be impeached by a prior
inconsistent statement made in compromise negotiations." See also Alaska R. Evid. 408.
67. 2 U.S.C. § 1416(b) (1997) (Congressional Accountability Act) ("All mediation shall
be strictly confidential."); 3 U.S.C. § 456(b) (1997) (Extension of Certain Rights and
Protections to Employees of Presidential Offices) ("All mediation under section 452 shall be
strictly confidential.").
68. 5 U.S.C. § 574(a) (1997). At least one statute treats the issue as one dealing with
admissibility of evidence at trial, rather than confidentiality or privilege. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(e)(2)(G) (1997) (Education of Individuals with Disabilities Act) ("Discussions that
occur during the mediation process shall be confidential and may not be used as evidence in
any subsequent due process hearings or civil proceedings and the parties to the mediation




the federal Administrative Procedure Act, Congress has enacted a statutory
mediation privilege which prohibits the disclosure of communications made during
the mediation process under the APA."9
Most of these statutes have been infrequently interpreted, and when they have
been addressed by the courts, the provisions have not been judicially construed to
give broad protection.7" For example, the Fifth Circuit in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena7 rejected the district court's determination that a federal mediation
privilege protected against a federal grand jury subpoena for records of a mediation
proceeding conducted pursuant to a state agricultural loan mediation program.
Although the Agriculture Credit Act requires that the mediation sessions be
"confidential," the court reasoned that there was no showing of clear manifestation
that Congress intended to create a privilege which would shield the mediation
proceeding from a federal grand jury.'
The 1998 Act did not create an evidentiary privilege to protect the confidenti-
ality of mediation or the ADR process. In the Act, Congress spelled out in detail
the extent of the protection afforded to confidentiality in court-annexed
arbitration" but was silent as to the extent of protection granted to confidentiality
in mediation or other types of court-annexed ADR. The Act provides that evidence
"concerning the conduct of the arbitration proceeding" is inadmissible, "unless the
evidence would otherwise be admissible in the court under the Federal Rules of
Evidence; or the parties have otherwise stipulated."' 4 Since Congress affiriatively
stated that it was protecting the confidentiality of court-annexed arbitration only
with the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is difficult to argue that by its silence, the
Act creates an evidentiary privilege which is applicable to mediation or other ADR
proceedings.
69. 5 U.S.C. § 574(a) (1997) (Dispute Resolution in the Administrative Process) ("[A]
neutral in dispute resolution proceeding shall not voluntarily disclose or through discovery or
compulsory process be required to disclose any dispute resolution communication or any
communication provided in confidence to the neutral, unless . . .-(b) A party to a dispute
resolution proceeding shall not voluntarily disclose or through discovery or compulsory
process be required to disclose any dispute resolution communication, unless.
70. See supra note 29.
71. 148 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998).
72. The opinion noted that the confidentiality of the mediation proceeding would not be
severely compromised by disclosure to the grand jury due to the secrecy of the grand jury
proceedings. Id. at 493.
73. See Plapinger & Stienstra, supra note I, at 61 ("Court-annexed arbitration is an
adjudicatory process in which one or more attorney arbitrators issue a non-binding judgment
on the merits after an expedited, adversarial hearing in which the attorneys for each party
present their cases. Witnesses are not called but exhibits may be submitted. The arbitrator's
decision addresses only the disputed legal issues and applies legal standards. Either party may
reject the nonbinding ruling and proceed to a trial de novo.").
74. ADR Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 9, 112 Stat. 2993, 2997 (1998) (to be
codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 657(c)(3) (1998)).
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The 1998 Act provides that until rules are adopted providing for confidentiality
of the ADR process, district courts shall adopt a local rule providing for the
"confidentiality of the alternative dispute resolution processes and to prohibit
disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications."' In this provision,
Congress recognized the obligaion to maintain the confidentiality of the dispute
resolution process. The provision, however, does not address the admissibility of
the evidence of ADR proceedings during a subsequent trial, or clearly create an
evidentiary privilege as Congress did in federal administrative hearings.
B. Mediation Privilege under Federal Rule 501
I. Generally
In promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress rejected the Supreme
Court's proposed fifteen rules governing the law of privilege in federal courts.
Although it retained most of the other proposed federal rules, Congress adopted a
single rule pertaining to privileges. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that in
federal courts the law of privilege is governed by "the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason
and experience. '  The Rule also recognizes that the Constitution, an Act of
Congress or rules promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority may also recognize privileges. The final sentence of Rule 501 provides
that in civil cases where the substantive law of a state supplies the rule of decision
with respect to an element of a claim or defense, that state's law of privilege will
be recognized in federal court. Thus, in a tort action where federal jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship, state substantive law applies and if that state has
a mediation privilege, it will be applied in the federal litigation."
In federal criminal prosecutions and in federal civil cases not based on
diversity jurisdiction, Rule 501 provides that the privileges which are recognized
shall "be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."" s Thus,
in a federal criminal action, an Internal Revenue Service investigation, or an action
alleging a violation of federal anti-trust statutes, a state mediation privilege will not
be recognized, even as to mediations which are ordered by a court of that state. In
these cases, the issue is whether a "common law" mediation privilege is recognized
75. ADR Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 4, 112 Stat. 2993, 2995 (1998) (to be
codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1998)).
76. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
77. Id. In Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., No.'95-2806, 1999 WL 909731 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 15, 1999), a magistrate judge considering a motion to enforce a mediation agreement
found that despite a local rule protecting the confidentiality of the federal court-sponsored
mediation, California law concerning the confidentiality of mediations was applicable since
California substantive contract law was applicable.
78. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
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under Rule 501, even when a state statutory mediation privilege protects the
communication. Recently, the Fifth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena 9
rejected the district court's determination that a federal mediation privilege
protected against a federal grand jury subpoena for records of a mediation
proceedings conducted pursuant to a state agricultural loan mediation program,
even though the mediation was conducted in Texas and was privileged under a
Texas statute.
2. "Common Law" Privileges Under Rule 501
Recently, the Supreme Court has faced a number of claims urging the
recognition of a new or novel evidentiary privilege and has provided principles for
guidance in recognizing new privileges.80 The Court has not articulated a precise
test to apply to the recognition of a privilege. Rather it has interpreted Rule 501 as
providing the federal courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case
by case basis." 'However, the Supreme Court has not been inclined "to exercise
this authority expansively."8" New privileges are not created lightly because of the
"duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving" 3 and because evidentiary
privileges are "in derogation of the search for truth.'"" The burden is on a party
asserting the recognition of a new privilege to clearly show the necessity of the
privilege."
79. 148 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998).
80. See Infra text accompanying notes 89-104.
81. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996).
82. University of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189, 110 S. Ct. 577, 582 (1990).
83. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9, 116 S. Ct. at 1928.
84. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3108 (1974). Jaffee
pointed out that the common law principle which guides federal courts is the maxim that
evidentiary or testimonial privileges are disfavored. "The common-law principles underlying
the recognition of testimonial privileges can be stated simply. 'For more than three centuries
it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public ... has a right to every
man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the
primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of
giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many
derogations from a positive general rule."' 518 U.S. at 9, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724 (1950) (quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940))).
85. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Public good was not shown
"with a high degree of clarity and certainty"); see also Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17, 116 S. Ct. at
1932 (rejecting the balancing approach adopted by some state courts that a privilege would
not apply where the evidentiary need for disclosure outweighed patient's privacy interest.
"Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the
relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for discfosure
would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege."); In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1154
(3d Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990).
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Although Rule 501 uses the phrase "principles of the common law," the rule
directs the courts to "continue the evolutionary development of testimonial
privileges" and does not freeze the law of privilege as it existed at some prior time
in legal history. 6 Nevertheless, privileges are not recognized under Rule 501
unless the new privilege "promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the
need for probative evidence.""
The Court has applied the above principles in Rule 501 cases to reject the
adoption of new privileges against the disclosure of "legislative acts" by state
legislators"8 and the disclosure of academic peer review. 9 The former privilege
was rejected even though the state constitution guaranteed the privilege in state
criminal proceedings. Additionally, several states recognize a statutory accountant-
client privilege.' The federal courts have rejected attempts to have the accountant-
client privilege recognized under Rule 501.91 The creation of an accountant-client
privilege was left for Congress during the 1998 session when it enacted a limited
privilege for communications between clients and federally authorized tax
practioners.92
86. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9, 116 S. Ct. at 1928.
87. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711, 94 S. Ct. at 3109 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 51, 100 S. Ct. 906, 913 (1980)).
88. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 100 S. Ct. 1185 (1980).
89. University of Penn. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189, 110 S. Ct. 577,582 (1990). In
declining to recognize a parent-child privilege under Rule 501, the In re Grand Jury court
observed that the Supreme Court has "rarely expanded common-law testimonial privileges"
into new areas. 103 F.3d at 1149. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805,
817, 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984) (rejecting work product immunity for accountants); Petersen v.
Douglas County Bank & Trust Co., 967 F.2d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting insurer-
insured confidentiality privilege); United States v. Holmes, 594 F.2d 1167, 1171 (8th Cir.
1979) (rejecting probation officer-parolee privilege); United States v. Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d
1389 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting an employer-stenographer privilege even though Oregon
statute recognized privilege).
90. See Therese LeBlanc, Accountant-Client Privilege: The Effect of the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of l998, 67 UMKC L. Rev. 583, 596 (1999) (listing fourteen
states as codifying the accountant-client privilege).
91. See In re International Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d 996 (11 th Cir. 1982) (Under Rule
501, Bankruptcy court was not required to apply Georgia's statutory accountant-client
privilege); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953) (no accountant-client
privilege to protect accountant's testimony and production of taxpayer's books from an
Internal Revenue Service summons even though Florida statutory accountant-client privilege
would have applied). Ironically, states' statutory accountant-client privileges were not
recognized in the very cases in which they were designed to protect communications.
92. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3411, 112 Stat. 685, 750 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1)) ("With respect to
tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality which apply to a communica-
tion between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a communication between a
taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent the communication would
be considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney.").
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In addition to recognizing a new "common law" psychotherapist-patient
privilege, in Jaffee v. Redmond," the Supreme Court provided a framework for
analysis for determining whether a new privilege will be recognized under Rule
50. 9" In deciding whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege should be
recognized, the Jaffee court first focused on the private interest served in
recognizing the privilege and found it present in the imperative need for confidence
and trust in the psychotherapist-patient relationship which arises because of the
need for the patient to make sensitive disclosures. Because some'disclosures may
cause embarrassment or disgrace, the possibility of disclosure may impede the
development of the necessary relationship.
The Jaffee court then reasoned that the privilege serves the necessary public
ends because it facilitates the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals
who suffer from mental or emotional problems. The evidentiary benefit from the
denial of the privilege was modest since the likelihood that a party would make an
admission would be diminished if the party knew the statements could be later used
against the declarant.
Recognition of the psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 was also
appropriate since all states have enacted some form of a psychotherapist patient
privilege. The consensus of the states in legislatively recognizing the privilege
indicated to the Jaffee court that "reason and experience" support the privilege.
Additionally, Jaffee reasoned that a state's promise of confidentiality would be
diminished if the patient was aware that the privilege would not be recognized in
federal court.
In addition, the Jaffee court looked to the fact that the privilege was among
those nine privileges specifically recommended for adoption by the Advisory
Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence.9 The court also observed the
reverse proposition; i.e., that if a privilege was not one of the nine originally
proposed by the Advisory Committee, it would cut against the recognition of the
privilege under the federal common law." Jaffee then concluded that it agreed with
the state legislatures and the Advisory Committee that recognition of the privilege
93. 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
94. A similar analysis was used by the Third Circuit, in a pre-Jaffee opinion in
recognizing the clergy-communicant privilege. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d
374 (3d Cir. 1990).
95. The circuit courts of appeals have also considered the recommendations of the
Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court as a useful guide in defining the federal common
law of privilege under Rule 501. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 380-81 (3d
Cir. 1990) ("[T]he proposed rules provide a useful reference point and offer guidance in
defining the existence and scope of evidentiary privileges in the federal courts. . . . The
Standards are the culmination of three drafts prepared by an Advisory Committee consisting
ofjudges, practicing lawyers and academicians.... Finally they were adopted by the Supreme
Court."); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
833. 100 S. Ct. 65 (1979).
96. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14, 116 S. Ct. at 1930.
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serves a "public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing
all rational means for ascertaining truth."'
Despite Jaffee, the federal courts have indicated a narrowing interpretation of
existing privileges and a hesitation to recognize new privileges under the principles
of the common law in a series of cases arising out of the investigation by the Office
of Independent Counsel. When a federal grandjury subpoenaed documents created
during meetings between Hillary Clinton and an attorney for the Office of
Independent Counsel, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the documents were not
protected by the attorney-client privilege even though the client had a reasonable
belief that the conversations were privileged."
Similarly, a new "protective function" privilege under Rule 501 with respect
to information obtained by Secret Service personnel while performing their
protective function in close proximity to the President was rejected by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court reasoned in In re Sealed Case,"
that the Supreme Court has demanded the proponent of a new privilege "come
forward with a compelling empirical case for the necessity of the privilege."" °
Because of the novelty of the Office of Independent Counsel's demand for the
testimony, the lack of federal or state precedent recognizing a protective function
privilege was dismissed. The court concluded that the Secret Service had not
demonstrated with compelling clarity that the failure to recognize the protective
privilege would effectivelyjeopardize its ability to protect the President. However,
the proposed protective function privilege was found not to clearly promote
interests which outweighed the need for the probative evidence. Thus, the Secret
Service failed under Rule 501 to carry its heavy burden to establish the need for the
protective function privilege. The question of whether a protective function
privilege was appropriate and, if so, "what the contours of that privilege should be"
was left to Congress.':
When asked by the Office of Independent Counsel to rule that the attorney-
client privilege does not survive the death of the client in criminal cases, the Court
in Swidler & Berlin v. United States,"2 focused on the "great body of caselaw"
supporting the recognition in cases involving the death of the client.'0 3 In rejecting
the argument of Independent Counsel, the Court distinguished between recognition
of privileges recognized by the common law and the interpretation of an existing
97. Id. at 15, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100
S. Ct. 906, 912 (1980)).
98. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
521 U.S. 1105, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
99. 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
100. Id. at 1076.
101. Id. at 1079. In In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1155 (3d Cir. 1997), in refusing to
recognize a parent-child privilege under Rule 501, the court commented that "we should be
chary about creating new privileges and ordinarily should defer to the legislature to do so."
102. 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
103. Id. at 2085.
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privilege. The Swidler & Berlin opinion suggests that the principle that privileges
"be strictly construed because they are inconsistent with the paramount judicial
goal of truth seeking" is limited to cases involving the creation of privileges
recognized by the common law. The court reasoned that since the attorney-client
privilege is one of the oldest privileges and the Court is asked to interpret it in a
manner which narrows it contrary to the weight of the case law, arguments against
the survival of the privilege are not sufficient where they are based largely on
"speculation" as to whether the termination of the privilege after death would
adversely effect a client's willingness to confide in an attorney. The court observed
that "[i]n an area where empirical information would be useful, it is scant and
inconclusive."''
1 4
3. "Common Law" Mediation Privilege
a. Jaffee-Analysis
Initially, a Jaffee analysis requires an examination of the private interests and
the public ends that a mediation privilege would serve.' 5 Among the private
interests served by a mediation privilege is recognition that effective mediation
depends on an atmosphere in which a party believes that what is disclosed to the
mediator or the opposing party is confidential. Commentators argue that increased
104. Id. at 2087.
105. A few pre-Jaffee decisions focused on whether some sort of mediation privilege
should be recognized, particularly in the field of labor relations. See NLRB v. Joseph
Macalusco, Inc., 618 F.2d 51(9th Cir. 1980) (Revoked subpoena from NLRB to mediator from
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service because the labor mediator's testimony would
result in public perception that the mediator was biased towards labor or management and
undermine the statutory labor structure designed to advance industrial peace, the interests of
the parties, and the nation's economic health.); Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F.Supp. 987
(D. D.C. 1981), aff'd, 459 U.S. 159, 103 S. Ct. 530 (1982) (mediators for federal Community
Relations Service could refuse to testify to any confidential information learned by mediating).
Rogers & McEwen, supra note 12, at 9:11 suggests that "[tihese cases do not indicate either
that there is a trend toward creation of a generic common law mediation privilege or that the
courts will generally interpret statutes creating mediation programs as requiring a common law
privilege. The FMCA and CRS cases involved ... legislative interest in encouraging
settlements through mediation, not the creation of a mediator privilege without legislative
guidance." See also Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Iowa 1987); Kientzy v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff'd, 990 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir.
1993).
On the other hand, Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994) involved a grand jury
subpoena to a mediator to give testimony concerning state mediation in an investigation of
RICO and federal securities law violations. The district court's opinion questioned the
validity of arguments that a mediator privilege was needed to create the appearance of
neutrality of the mediator and to insure an adequate supply of mediators. The court also




party participation and control over decisions, as well as an improved level of
communication that occurs between the parties, are private interests served by the
mediation process. " The possibility of disclosure may impede the development
of the relationships necessary for successful mediation and result in the parties
having to resolve the action through the trial process. Thus, important private
interests will be served by the recognition of the privilege.
The public interest is also served by the recognition of a mediation privilege
because it will help to foster the growth of mediation. As Congress has recognized,
mediation may promote faster and more frequent resolution of disputes outside the
courtroom by reducing the large backlog of pending cases and allowing the courts
to process their remaining cases more efficiently. 07 ADR enables the state to
provide a method of dispute resolution which has the potential to create greater
satisfaction to its citizens who are more likely to be satisfied with the outcome than
using the traditional litigation method.' Additionally it has been argued that
mediators do not appear to be neutral if required to testify. '9
106. SeeBush, What Do We NeedaMediatorFor?,supra note 12; Kirtley, supranote 12,
at 10 ("A principal purpose of the mediation privilege is to provide mediation parties
protection against these downside risks of a failed negotiation."); Fisher et al., supra note 2,
at 33.
The Reporter's Notes to the Uniform Act observe that "disputant participation in the
mediation process, often with counsel, allows for results that are tailored to the disputants'
needs, and leads the disputants to be more satisfied with the resolution of their disputes." (July
1999 draft), available at Uniform Mediation Act (visited Nov. 30, 1999)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/medam99.htm>.
107. P.L. 105-315, § 2(2), 112 Stat. 2993 (1998). For the view that there is no evidence
that mediation promotes these benefits, see James S. Kakalik et al., An Evaluation of
Mediation and Early Neutral Evaluation under the Civil Justice Reform Act 51-53 (1996)(referred to as the RAND Report) (suggests there is "no strong statistical evidence that the
mediation or neutral evaluation programs, . . . significantly affected time to disposition,
litigation costs, or attorneys views of fairness or satisfaction with case management").
Compare Craig A. McEwen & Elizabeth Plapinger, RAND Report Points Way to NextGeneration of ADR Research, Dispute Resolution Magazine 10 (Summer 1997).
108. Commentators have argued that other public values are advanced by mediations. See
Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, supra note 12, at 12 (Mediation makes the 'parties
responsible for important process and outcome decisions and requires the parties to find and
accept compromise solutions; "both the experience of the mediation process and the kind of
results it produces serve the public value of civic education in self-determination and respect
for others."). The justifications for the strong policy encouraging mediation are that the
mediation "empower[s] citizens to resolve their own disputes, ...help[s] restore and
strengthen strained relationships" and serves as "a means to reform the civil justice system."
Thompson, supra note 49, at 360-61.
109. See Kirtley, supra note 12, at 10 ("Another critical purpose of the privilege is to
maintain the public's perception that individual mediators and the mediation process are
neutral and unbiased."). This argument and the argument that there would be a shortage of
rfiediators if mediators were required to testify was'questioned in Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D.
661, 674 (N.D.Tex. 1994).
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Most states have adopted some sort of a mediation privilege."' Some
jurisdictions broadly apply the privilege to all mediations."' Another approach is
to limit the applicability of a privilege to mediations offered by a particular
institution, such as a specific publicly-funded entity and not recognize a privilege
which applies to all mediations."' Others limit the privilege to court-ordered or
court-annexed mediations."' If the state does not protect confidentiality with a
privilege, it is protected by Rule 408 or a similar common law rule protecting
settlement negotiations." 4 As contrasted with the psychotherapist privilege, there
is more variance in the protections adopted by the states and not as strong a
consensus expressing a consistent policy determination from which it can be
reasoned that "reason" and "experience" support the recognition of a broad
mediation privilege. An additional factor not present in Jaffee is the lack of
consensus of the district courts in protecting the confidentiality of court-based
mediation though their local rules. However, it is unclear from reading Jaffee the
110. Rogers & McEwen, supra note 12, at Appendices A and B contains a list of the states
adopting some sort of mediation privilege. See Assey, supra note 17, at 995.
111. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-307(2) (1998) ("Any party or the mediator or mediation
organization in a mediation service proceeding or a dispute resolution proceeding shall not
voluntarily disclose or through discovery or compulsory process be required to disclose any,
information concerning any mediation communication or any communication provided in
confidence to the mediator or a mediation organization ..... ); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 435.014(2)
(1992) ("No admission, representation, statement or other confidential communication made
in setting up or conducting such [mediation] proceedings not otherwise discoverable or
obtainable shall be admissible as evidence or subject to discovery"); Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12
§ 1805 (West 1998) ("Any information received by a mediator or a person employed to assist
a mediator, through files, reports, interviews, memoranda, case summaries, or notes and work
products of the mediator, is privileged and confidential."); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
154.073(a) (1997) ("Except as provided by Subsections (c) and (d). a communication relating
to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative
dispute resolution procedure, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial
proceedings, is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence
against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding."); Wash. Rev. Code §
7.75.050 (1992) ("Any communication relating to the subject matter of the resolution made
during the (alternative dispute] resolution process by any participant, mediator, or any other
person is a privileged communication and is not subject to disclosure in any judicial or
administrative proceeding...."); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 904.085(3) (West 1998) ("Except as
provided under sub. (4). no oral or written communication relating to a dispute in mediation
made or presented in mediation by the mediator or a party is admissible in evidence or subject
to discovery or compulsory process in any judicial or administrative proceeding.").
112. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-381.16 (West 1998) (domestic violence centers); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 176.351 (West 1998) (workers compensation bureau); N.Y. Lab. Law § 717
(McKinney 1998) (department of labor's state mediation board).
113. Fla. Stat. ch. 44.102(3) (1997). See also M.D. Fla. R. 9.07.
114. Mississippi does not have a mediation privilege, but it has a confidentiality provision
in the standing order authorizing a pilot mediation program, Miss. Order 98-9 (Pilot Mediation
Program), § 7, and has the protection of Miss. R. Evid. 408. Vermont does not have a
mediation privilege, but protects for statements made during mediation by specifically
including mediation within Vt. R. Evid. 408.
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significance of the apparent lack of agreement concerning a broad privilege."' If
the mediation privilege provision presently included in the Proposed Uniform
Mediation Act is widely adopted by the states, this factor used to determine
whether to recognize a "common law" privilege will more clearly be present."16
Cutting against the recognition of mediation privilege is the failure of the
Advisory Committee to include a mediation privilege in the nine evidentiary
privileges it recommended." 7  The only "common law" privilege generally
recognized in the federal courts which was not included in the Advisory Commit-
tee's proposals is the marital confidential communication privilege. " If the failure
of the Advisory Committee to recommend a mediation privilege is the only Jaffee
factor not present, recognition of the new privilege would probably not be defeated
115. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 14 n.13, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1937 n.13 (1996) (The
divergence among the states concerning the matters protected by the privilege was not deemed
significant in light of the state's unanimous judgement that "some form of psychotherapist
privilege is appropriate."). In In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 381 (3d Cir.
1990), the court, in recognizing a clergy privilege, said that "virtually every state has
recognized some form of clergy-communicant privilege." Differences in the form or the types
of proceedings protected by state mediation privileges may not be significant to the issue of
whether a mediation privilege should be recognized under Rule 501.
116. The American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are in the initial stages of drafting a
Uniform Mediation Act. The first issue the drafters focused on was confidentiality. See
Richard Rueben and Nancy H. Rogers, Movement TowardA Uniform Confidentiality Privilege
Faces Cross-currents, Dispute Resolution Magazine 4 (Winter 1998). Uniform Mediation Act§ 2 provides: ""(a) A disputant may refuse to disclose, and prevent any other person from
disclosing, mediation communications in a civil,juvenile, criminal misdemeanor, arbitration,
or administrative proceeding.... (b) A mediator may refuse to disclose, and prevent any other
person from disclosing, the Mediator's mediation communications and may refuse to provide
evidence of mediation communications in a civil,juvenile, criminal misdemeanor, arbitration,
or administrative proceeding. . . ." (July 1999 Draft), available at Uniform Mediation Act(visited Nov. 30, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/medam99.htm>.
117. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1151 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2412 (1997) (In refusing to recognize a parent-child privilege under Rule 501 the court said:
"[T~he parent child privilege... was not among the enumerated privileges submitted by the
Advisory Committee. Although this fact, in and of itself, is not dispositive with respect to the
question as to whether this court should create a privilege, it strongly suggests that the
Advisory Committee,... did not regard confidential parent-child communications sufficiently
important to warrant 'privilege' protection."). The privilege rules included in the Revised
Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates are reported at
51 F.R.D. 315, 356-83.
118. The Advisory Committee did include a privilege for the accused spouse to assert a
privilege to prevent a witness spouse from testifying. In Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980), the Court held that a testifying spouse has the sole right to claim
a marital privilege to avoid testifying against an accused-spouse, rather than the proposed rule
which gave the accused-spouse the right to bar a spouse's testimony. Trammel recognized the
continued vitality of the marital communications privilege in the federal courts. 445 U.S. at
46, 100 S. Ct. at 911.
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since the Advisory Committee's recommendations were made in 1972, before
mediation became widely accepted. "9
In weighing whether an evidentiary privilege should be recognized, the courts
will consider whether the protection of the privilege is worth the cost. The loss of
information to society and the justice system is the most obvious cost. A mediation
privilege differs in at least one significant aspect to most other "common law"
privileges. In the latter, only the professional and the protected party have
knowledge of the contents of the privileged communication. In the case of the
mediation privilege, knowledge of the communications in the joint session is
possessed by the opposing party. If the mediation fails, the parties proceed to trial,
and the mediation privilege prohibits the introduction of relevant evidence, the
party who sought unsuccessfully to admit the evidence may be aware of its
contents. If the party perceives that mediation and an accompanying privilege lead
to an unjust trial or outcome, the public acceptance of mediation may be under-
mined.' So too, if a mediation privilege excludes evidence of an offer to settle a
personal injury action made by an insurance carrier during a mediation in a
subsequent action against the carrier for the bad faith failure to settle the claim, a
strong argument could be made that the concepts of truth and justice would be
denied. The recognition of a common law privilege will require the careful
consideration of exceptions in order to insure that the protection is worth the
cost.,,,
An important issue is whether the analysis used to recognize a common law
mediation privilege under Rule 501 differs because of the presence of Rule 408,
which generally protects against the admission of statements made during
settlement negotiations."' No other confidential communication protected under
Rule 501 is also protected by an exclusionary rule of evidence. Rule 408 does not
119. See Dana Shaw, Mediation Certification: An Analysis of the Aspects of Mediator
Certification and an Outlook on the Trend of Formulating Qualifications for Mediators, 29
Tol. L. Rev. 327, 329 (1998) (discussing the evolution of mediation).
120. See Green, supra note I7, at 10. Although Professor Green makes a similar argument
against a blanket confidentiality privilege, the concern is greatest if statements made during
the joint mediation sessions in the presence of the opposing party are completely shielded from
the judge and jury by a privilege. A party is not aware of statements made by the opponent
during a private caucus between the opponent and her attorney.
121. Section 2(c) of the Uniform Mediation Act (July 1999 Draft), available at Uniform
Mediation Act (visited Nov. 30, 1999)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/medam99.htm>, provides nine exceptions to the
privilege, including the record of agreement, evidence of abuse, reports of professional
misconduct, complaints against the mediator, threats of bodily harm or property damage and
use of the process to commit a crime.
122. A privilege offers greater protection of confidentiality than does Rule 408. See
Kirtley, supra note 12, at 11-12. If a mediation privilege is applicable, a party in another
proceeding cannot use the discovery process to invade the mediation. A mediation privilege
would prohibit the use of statements made during mediation and offered during trial to attack
credibility, while Rule 408 may not. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
1999]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
go as far in extending the cloak of confidentiality as does a mediation privilege.
For example, a privilege shields the mediation process from discovery and does not
permit privileged matter to be used to impeach the credibility of a witness.'. For
years, parties have negotiated settlements outside of the mediation or ADR process
with only the protection of Rule 408 and without the protection of an evidentiary
privilege. Rule 408 promotes many of the interests that would be served by a
mediation privilege.'"4 Obviously there is greater protection of confidentiality with
a mediation privilege than without. However, a clear articulation of what is special
about mediation requiring a broad protection of communications with a privilege
rather than only applying the Rule 408 exclusion is necessary.' In both Swidler
& Berlin2' and In re Sealed Case, 7 the courts emphasized the need for empirical
evidence to support the recognition of a new privilege or to restrict the application
of an existing one. In light of these recent decisions, the most persuasive argument
to recognize a mediation privilege under Rule 501 would be based on empirical
data that demonstrates that the values of mediation are enhanced in jurisdictions
which have a broad mediation privilege as contrasted with those which simply
protect confidentiality with Rule 408."s For example, research which demonstrates
that substantially more cases are resolved prior to trial in states that have a
mediation privilege or that its citizens have greater satisfaction in the process when
a privilege is applicable than in states that only use the Rule 408 protection. 9 If
this data is presented, the public interest served by the privilege more clearly
appears. If the mediation process cannot be shown to be enhanced by the presence
of the privilege, the most recent federal cases indicate that it is unlikely the
123. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 23, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that psychotherapist-patient privilege should not be recognized under
Rule 501, in part because it would permit a defendant "to deny her guilt in the criminal
trial-or in a civil trial for negligence-while yet obtaining the benefits of psychotherapy by
confessing guilt to a social worker who cannot testify").
124. See Green, supra note 17, at I (arguing that blanket mediation privileges are
unnecessary, unjustified and counterproductive and that adequate protection exists under
current law).
125. Rogers & McEwen, supra note 12, at § 9.02 ("Implicit in the policy debate about
broadened confidentiality for mediation is the assumption that there is something special
about mediation that warrants a broader exclusion than is provided for compromise
discussions without a mediator. Rarely is the basis for the assumption articulated .....
126. Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
127. 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
128. Green, supra note 17, at 31-2, suggests that there is no data that supports the
proposition that a blanket mediation privilege assuring confidentiality is essential to the
mediation process.
129. Green, supra note 17, at 33-35, suggests there is no empirical research. Scott H.
Hughes, Confidentiality In Mediation: A Closer Look, Dispute Resolution Magazine 14
(Winter 1998) ("almost no" empirical data exists to support the need for a mediation
privilege). See generally, James S. Kakalik et al., An Evaluation of Mediation and Early
Neutral Evaluation under the Civil Justice Reform Act 51, 53 (1996) ("sound empirical
research on various ADR mechanisms is quite thin").
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privilege will be recognized Under Rule 501. The federal courts would then defer
to Congress to decide if a mediation privilege should be recognized, and if so, in
what form." 0
b. Parameters
The parameters of the privilege will not immediately be delineated. Rather, as
in Jaffee and Upjohn Co. v. United States,3' the Supreme Court will leave the
refinement of the privilege to occur in the lower federal courts on a case-by-case
basis."' In recognizing the application of a psychotherapist-patient privilege and
an attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, the Court declined to go
beyond holding that the privilege was present under the facts of each case and
stated that the details of the privilege should be developed on a case-by-case
basis.'33 Therefore, it is unlikely that the federal courts will soon supply answers
to many questions, such as whether a privilege extends to statements during
premediation, to statements during the caucus and/or the joint session and to
demeanor or conduct, as well as the issue of waiver. However, the contours of the
privilege would be influenced by the judgments made by the states who recognize
the mediation privilege. 4
c. Qualified or Absolute
A "common law" mediation privilege under Rule 501 should not be a qualified
privilege, in that its protection should not depend on the court's balancing the need
for the disclosure against interest in confidentiality to determine whether the
privilege is applicable. Making confidentiality contingent upon a judge's
130. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1154 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2412
(1997) ("The legislature, not the judiciary, is institutionally better equipped to perform the
balancing of the competing policy issues required in deciding whether the recognition of a
parent-child privilege is in the best interests of society. Congress, through its legislative
mechanisms, is also better suited for the task of defining the scope of any prospective
privilege.").
131. 449 U.S. 383, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981) (recognizing attorney-client privilege in
corporate context).
132. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 1990) (Recognizingclergy
privilege under Rule 501 but declining to address who can assert the privilege. "The precise
scope of the privilege and its additional facets ... are ... most suitably left to case-by-case
evolution.").
133. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,407-09 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2086-87
(1998); the Court noted in the ease of the attorney-client privilege that an uncertain privilege
is often better than no privilege at all.
134. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15,116 S. Ct. 1923, 1938 (1996) (noting that a
majority.of states extend a testimonial privilege to licensed social workers in determining that
the Rule 501 psychotherapist-patient privilege should be extended to "confidential
communications made to licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy").
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subsequent evaluation of the relative importance of the competing interests "would
eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege."'35 The Court previously has rejected
arguments that the attorney-client 36 and psychotherapist-patient"" privilege should
be qualified rather than absolute. To serve the purposes of these privileges, the
Court has reasoned that the participants in the conversations must be able to predict
with some certainty whether discussions will be protected. The application of a
balancing of interests to determine whether a privilege is present would negate the
purpose and effectiveness of a mediation privilege.'
d. Exceptions
-Recognition of a Rule 501 privilege involves a weighing of competing interests
and social values. Even if there are sufficient interests in confidentiality to
recognize a privilege in most cases, there may be specific situations in which a
different social policy may outweigh the general need for the privilege.' A
privilege should not be misused with the result that significant evidence is lost
while the purposes of the privilege are not promoted. Courts and evidence
codifications attempt to solve this problem by providing that an "exception" to a
privilege is present. For example, in the case of the attorney-client privilege, when
the client seeks the attorney's services with respect to ongoing or future crime or
fraud, the privilege is not recognized." Clients are not entitled to use lawyers to
assist them in pursuing unlawful or fraudulent objectives. If the privilege protected
such communications, public confidence in the system and the profession would
be lost. Similarly, while the Jaffee court recognized a new psychotherapist
privilege, it also observed that "there are situations in which the [psychotherapist-
135. Id. at 17.
136. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399, 101 S. Ct. 677, 686 (1981). See
Swidler and Berlin v. United States, I 18 S. Ct. 2081 (1998) (rejecting court of appeal's
decision that whether the attorney-client privilege should be recognized in criminal
proceedings after the death of the client is subject to a thorough case-by-case balancing of
interests); In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
137. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
138. This policy choice was rejected by Congress when it adopted 5 U.S.C. § 574 (a)(4)
(1997) which provides that the statutory mediation privilege for dispute resolution in the
federal administrative process does not attach to a communication if a court determines that
the testimony or disclosure is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.
139. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13,53 S. Ct. 465,469 (1933) ("[Tihe recognition
of a privilege does not mean that it is without conditions or exceptions. The social policy that
will prevail in many situations may run foul in others of a different social policy, competing
for supremacy. It is then the function of a Court to mediate between them .... ).
140. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63, 109 S. Ct. 2619, 2629-31 (1989)
(discussing the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege).
An exception to the privilege is also recognized when the heirs of a deceased client are
claiming against the estate in a dispute over the decedent's will. See Swindler & Berlin, 524




patient] privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm to the
patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the
therapist."' 4' A balancing of interests recognizes that the safety of the threatened
person outweighs the generalized need for the privilege.
Just as they use a restrained approach to define the parameters of Rule 501
privileges, federal courts are reluctant to spell out the exceptions to recognized
privileges in detail; rather, they are developed when appropriate cases arise. The
principles of comity will not provide significant assistance to the federal courts
since state statutory privileges vary widely; some recognize no express
exceptions,"' while others recognize a variety of them. 43 Among the situations
that may lead to recognition of exceptions to a "common law" mediation privilege
are when a party to the mediation makes a serious threat to the safety of another.'"
As with the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the interest in the safety of the
citizens may outweigh the need for the privilege. Both the lawyers representing the
parties to mediation as well as the mediators may be liable for certain inappropriate
actions which occur during the mediation. The party instituting such an action
should not be able to assert the privilege to bar the defendant from testifying; nor
should the defendant be able to assert the privilege to bar the plaintiff from proving
the misconduct.4
141. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19, 116 S. Ct. at 1936 n.19. See United States v. Glass, 133
F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998) (Applying psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal case to
statements made by defendant during counseling session with psychotherapist but remanding
for trial court to determine if the defendant's threat of harm to the President was serious and
if it could be averted only by disclosure, in which case the privilege would not protect the
communication.). Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 contained three exceptions to the
psychotherapist privilege.
142. Fla. Stat. ch. 90.501 (1997); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-501 (1997).
143. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-614 (1998) (evidentiary privileges inapplicable in child
abuse cases); V.I. Code Ann. Tit. 5, § 856 (1998) (exceptions to marital privilege); Ala. R.
Evid. 504(d) (exceptions to marital privilege).
144. Uniform Mediation Act § 2(c)(2) (July 1999 Draft), available at Uniform Mediation
Act (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <htttp://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/medam99.htm>.
145. See Lynn A. Epstein, Post-Settlement Malpractice: Undoing the Done Deal, 46
Cath. U. L. Rev. 453 (1997) (suggested that in every state but one a client is permitted to
proceed with the action based on the theory that the client's lawyer negligently negotiated an
agreement despite the fact that the client consented to the agreement).
Similarly, if the mediator observes misconduct of the attorneys or the attorneys observe
misconduct of the mediator, a strong argument exists that the privilege should not extend to
prohibit testimony concerning misconduct. If an ethics complaint is filed against an attorney
or the mediator arising out of the mediation, a mediation privilege should not prohibit the
attorney or mediator from testifying to what occurred during the mediation. See Pamela A.
Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict For Attorney-
Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and The Duty to Report
Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 715.
Although mediators generally are immune from suit for their actions during the mediation
proceeding, the decisions assume there are situations in which immunity will not be
recognized. See. e.g., Postma v. First Fed. Say. and Loan, 74 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1996)
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Exceptions are recognized in the limited statutory mediation privilege enacted
by Congress in federal administrative proceedings 4" as well as in the current draft
of the Uniform Mediation Act. Exceptions to both the Rule 501 "common law"
attorney-client and psychotherapist patient privileges are well recognized and
accepted. These privileges protect interests which are at least as important as those
protected by a "common law" mediation privilege. Just as exceptions are
recognized in limited situations to the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient
privileges, exceptions should be recognized to a mediation privilege when social
policy outweighs the need for the privilege. 47
VI. CONCLUSION
Both the increased use of mediation and the adoption of the ADR Act of 1988
will inevitably lead to a corresponding need for federal courts to more clearly
define the extent of the protection extended to the confidentiality of mediation
proceedings. The extent of protection may be clear under state law, which is
applicable under Federal Rule 501 when state substantive law supplies the rule of
decision. However, in federal criminal cases and in civil cases where federal law
supplies the rule of decision, an analysis of the relevant interests is necessary to
determine the protection afforded confidentiality. In this latter situation, when
failed mediations subsequently result in federal jury trials, or state-court mediations
are the subject of discovery or introduction during a federal trial or proceeding,
local rules of court, Rule 408 and a "common law" mediation privilege provide
different protections for confidentiality.
The most well-defined protection is Rule 408 which applies to all mediation
proceedings, as it does to other compromise or settlement discussions. Many argue
that the extent of the protection provided to the confidentiality of mediation by
Rule 408 is insufficient. " The perceived problem is that the rule only deals with
(Iowa law immune from suit unless mediator acted "in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or
in a manner exhibiting willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety or property");
Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (immunity so long as mediator's
actions "were taken within the scope of his duties ... "); Mills v. Killebrew, 765 F.2d 69 (6th
Cir. 1985) (mediator was entitled to immunity unless mediator acted in "the clear absence of
all jurisdiction").
146. 5 U.S.C.A. § 574 (4) (1997) provides that the confidentiality of the mediation
proceeding will not be maintained if a court determines that the disclosure is necessary to help
establish a violation of law or to prevent harm to the public health or safety.
147. If a motion or hearing raises a material issue of the conduct of the parties during the
mediation, such as requesting Rule I I sanctions, the privilege will probably not be a shield
for otherwise sanctionable conduct. Doe v. Nebraska, 971 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Neb. 1997)(Although statements made during mediation proceedings shall "notbe admissible in evidence
for any reason in the trial of the case," the rule would not bar evidence of statements made
during mediation proceeding in an adversary hearing concerning a motion for sanctions
arising from a failed mediation session.).
148. See Assey, supra note 17; Jonathan Hyman, The Model Mediator Confidentiality
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the inadmissibility of evidence at trial when the evidence is offered to prove the
liability for the underlying claim. If the evidence is offered for another material
purpose, such as showing bias or perhaps as a prior inconsistent statement, the
evidence of the mediation proceeding may not be excluded.'49 Similarly, it is
argued it does not provide sufficient protection for confidentiality since it does not
prevent otherwise appropriate discovery of the mediation proceeding.'" On the
other hand, for years parties have successfully negotiated settlements and
compromised matters outside of the mediation or ADR process with only the
protection of Rule 408 and its common law ancestors. There has been no outcry
that a greater protection for confidentiality is necessary to enable the parties to
successfully negotiate settlements.
The breadth of two other sources of protection for confidentiality in federal.
courts is uncertain. Local rules adopted by many district courts recognize that
mediation and other forms of court-based ADR are confidential. However, the
rules are inconsistent, poorly drafted and sometimes confusing. Moreover, there
is no consensus among the districts as to the extent of the protection.
The local rules, in fact, may serve as a trap for the unwary practitioner from
outside the district who mediates in a court-based program. Counsel may assume
that the foreign district's rule relating to confidentiality is the same as the district
in which counsel normally practices. As Part III of this paper demonstrates, such
an assumption is misguided. Moreover, it is not good policy to have significant
variance in the provisions of local rules dealing with the issue of confidentiality.
Even if a local rule clearly states the extent of the protection given confidentiality
of mediation, the protection is limited to federal district-court based ADR
programs. Usually, mediations which occur in state court or voluntary, pre-suit
mediations are not protected.
The broadest protection for the confidentiality of mediation would be present
if a testimonial or evidentiary mediation privilege is recognized in federal courts.
Since there is no statutory general federal mediation privilege, a Jaffee analysis
must be employed to determine whether a "common law" privilege will be
recognized under Rule 501. Significant private and public interests will be served
by recognition of a "common law" mediation privilege. However, it is not clear
that there is a consensus that a mediation privilege should be recognized under the
principles of the common law as interpreted in light of reason and experience.
While it can be argued that most states have enacted a mediation privilege in some
form, the wide diversity of protection in the district court local rules indicates that
there is no consensus in the federal district courts themselves. The wide-spread
Rule: A Commentary, 12 Seton Hall Legis. J. 17 (1988); Kirtley, supra note 12.
149. Green, supra note 17, at 35, argues that the adoption of a mediation privilege is a
"bad idea" and that the protection of Rule 408 provided to the confidentiality of mediation is
sufficient if Rule 408 clearly excludes evidence of the compromise negotiations which are
offered for impeachment.
150. Kirtley, supra, note 12, at 13.
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adoption by the states of a mediation privilege in the Uniform Mediation Act now
being drafted would bolster the argument that a consensus was present.
Recently, federal courts have indicated a preference for empirical evidence to
support the recognition of a new "common law" privilege. According to these
cases, the strongest argument to recognize a new Rule 501 privilege is based on
data showing that the interests underlying the privilege are enhanced by the
privilege. In other words, the values that mediation advances are better served in
those jurisdictions that have a mediation privilege than in those that only have
confidentiality protected with Rule 408. Those favoring a privilege would be well-
served to develop relevant data.
With the enactment of the 1998 Act, the use of mediation in federal courts will
substantially increase. The need to resolve the extent of the protection of
confidentiality of statements made during mediation will similarly become more
important. Rule 408 clearly protects the confidentiality of mediation proceedings.
The extent of protection afforded a court-based program is uncertain. Whether a
"common law" mediation privilege will be recognized after applying the Jaffee
factors is unclear primarily because of the lack of a strong consensus among the
states and district courts regarding the privilege and the lack of data to support the
need for the privilege. Particularly in light of the recent decisions arising out of the
Office of Independent Counsel, it appears unlikely that the federal courts will soon
recognize a Rule 501 "common law" privilege. In the near future, the uncertainty
surrounding the extent of the protection granted to the confidentiality of mediation
proceedings in federal courts will continue unless Congress acts to statutorily
define the protection as it recently did for communications to tax preparers and for
communications made during dispute resolution in the federal administrative
process.
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